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Due Process; A Detached Judge; And Enemy
Combatants
By Julian Mann, III*
Abstract
In the landmark administrative law decision of Goldberg v. Kelly,
Justice Brennan stated that an "impartial decision maker is essential"
to procedural due process. As a corollary, in the more recent
decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor stated that "due
process requires a neutral and a detached judge in the first instance."
Thus, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution require that the essential
element of neutrality remain an integral part of any administrative
hearing. There can be no departure from this fundamental guarantee
of constitutional due process for the administrative hearings accorded
to enemy combatants.
* Chief Administrative Law Judge and the Director of the North Carolina
Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Due Process of Law encompasses a broad range of concepts and
definitions, but within the framework of this article, due process will
refer to procedural due process,' not substantive due process. The
genesis of due process in American jurisprudence originated in the
United States Constitution followed by a long history of Supreme Court
interpretations.3 Additionally, conforming references are found in the
various state constitutions with corresponding state court decisions.4
More specifically, the words, "due process," were written into the Bill
of Rights as found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution--"[n]o person shall be.. .deprived of life, liberty, or
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (5th ed. 1979). Procedural due
process is defined as:
Those safeguards to one's liberty and property mandated by the
14th Amend., U.S. Const., such as the right to counsel appointed
for one who is indigent, the right to a copy of a transcript, the
right of confrontation; all of which are specifically provided for
in the 6th Amendment and made applicable to the states'
procedure by the 14th Amendment.
Central meaning of procedural due process is that parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard and, in order that
they may enjoy that right, they must be notified. Parham v.
Cortese, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1994, 32 L.Ed.2d 556.
Reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard and present any
claim or defense are embodied in the term "procedural due
process." In re Nelson, 78 N.M. 739, 437 P.2d 1008.
2. Id. at 1281. Substantive due process is defined as: "[t]he constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty or property;
the essence of substantive due process is protection from arbitrary and
unreasonable action. Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, La., 341 So.2d 396,
400."
3. See generally J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process,
31 COLUM. L. REv. 56 (1931).
4. See infra text p. 4 noting that all of the pre-1787 State Constitutions referred
to the Law of the Land and not due process, but the terms are commonly
interchangeable. Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy noted that "[a]fter Sir
Edward Coke declared 'law of the land' to be synonymous with 'due process of
law,' prominent American commentators, including Kent, Storey, and Cooley,
continued this association, thereby suggesting to early American lawyers that the
concept of 'due process of law' was derived from the Magna Carta." See Sidney
A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward
a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 112, n. 21 (2005)
(citing Edward S. Corwin, Due Process of Law before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L.
REv. 366, 368 (1911)).
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property without due process of law[.]"5 Some of the original states
insisted upon the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution,
including the more specific reference to the due process clause in the
Fifth Amendment, before those states would ratify the United States
Constitution.6  The right to due process provided by the Fifth
Amendment applies to Federal Government action. The Civil War
amendments made the right to due process applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment which states "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw[.]r7
Due process procedures are defined by ages of judicial
development, dating back to the English Magna Carta in the 13th
century.
XXIX (39). No Free-man's body shall be taken nor
imprisoned, nor disseised nor outlawed, nor banished,
nor in any ways be damaged, nor shall the King send
him to prison by force, excepting by the Judgment of
his Peers and by the law of the land.
XXV (52) If anyone have been dispossessed or
deprived by the King without judgment of his lands,
his liberties or his rights, they shall be immediately
restored; 8
The first known reference to the words, "due process," was found
in the English Statute of 1354: "[t]hat no man of what estate or
condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken
nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in answer by due process of law."9
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
6. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 941,
974-77 (1990).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
8. Magna Carta, ch. 39 & 52 (1215) (emphasis added). The Barons did not
demand an adjudication by one of King John's judges-apparently, they demanded
a jury trial.
9. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 941
(1990) (quoting 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (1354) (noting that due process seems to require
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Lord Edward Coke in 1628 connected the identification of due
process and the Law of the Land provision.' In 1692, a
Massachusetts Act contained the first known reference to due process
of law in an American document." All of the pre-1787 State
Constitutions referred to the Law of the Land and not due process. 12
Due process of law and its application have been historically
restricted to what occurs in judicial courts. In contrast to these ancient
English authorities and their impact upon the development of due
process in constitutional courts, most of today's authorities agree that
the progeny of the modem administrative law due process rights arose
following Goldberg v. Kelly. 13 Justice Brennan defined the issue in
Goldberg as follows: "[t]he constitutional issue to be decided,
therefore, is the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires
that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of benefits."1 4 Based upon eight hundred years of evolving
jurisprudence and over two hundred years under the U.S. Constitution,
a deprivation of a property interest by the sovereign expanded from the
exclusive domain of judicial branch courts to quasi-judicial hearings in
that the appropriate Writ be used to summon the accused before the court to answer
the complaint, i.e. Notice)).
10. 2 E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 50 (1628).
11. See Raoul Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 N.W. U. L. REv.
1, 8 (1979-80) (citing R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 97 (1926). Section 1 of the
Massachusetts Act provided: "[t]hat no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or be
desseized of his freehold.... nor shall be.. .condemned, but by the lawful judgment
of his peers or the law of this province." R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 97 n.43
(1926) (quoting 1692 MASS. ACTS § 1).
12. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. § 19:
Law of the land; equal protection of the laws.
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of
the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the
State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(emphasis added); see generally Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REv.
941, 974-7 (1990).
13. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
14. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
the executive branch. The authority for the expansion was not by
construction of a statute such as might be found in an Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), but by construction of the constitutional right to
due process. 15 Suddenly, with the issuance of Goldberg,
administrative law tribunals could also trace their lineage through
twelve centuries of due process history back to the Magna Carta.'
6
Closely following the development of a legally protected property
interest in governmentally created entitlements, the U.S. Supreme
Court enunciated other protected property (and liberty) interests and
accorded them protection through administrative proceedings grounded
in the authority of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. This expansive interpretation of the interests protected
by the due process clauses spawned the greatly expanded judicial type
procedures found today in both state and federal administrative
hearings. The rationale for the new governmentally-created property
interest identified in Goldberg was closely followed by the Supreme
Court in several other landmark cases including Mathews v. Eldridge,
17
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,18 Bell v. Burson,'9
Withrow v. Larkin,20 and Goss v. Lopez.2 1 These cases clearly focused
on the issue of how much process was due in relationship to a newly
defined property interest and whether this process must occur before
the taking or termination of the new property interest. After
Goldberg,22 every administrative hearing procedure was potentially
subject to judicial scrutiny to determine whether the administrative
procedure was minimally compliant with the Due Process clauses of
15. Id. at 261.
16. Justice Brennan asserted in Goldberg that an impartial decision maker was
essential to administrative law due process. The historical context of Goldberg,
issued in 1970 at the height of the Vietnam War, was a grave mistrust by the
American populace for the unquestioning authority of executive power.
17. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (regarding disability benefits).
18. 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (regarding discharge from public employment).
19. 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (regarding suspension of driver's license).
20. 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (regarding professional licensing) (discussing the
requirement for a neutral decision maker).
21. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (regarding public education) (here, the Supreme
Court was called upon to decide the question of how much process was due in
the discharge of a pupil who possessed both a property interest and liberty
interest in his education).
22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. To avoid this judicial analysis on
an ad hoc basis under the Fourteenth Amendment, many state
legislatures ultimately drafted broad and uniform Administrative
Procedure Acts (APAs) that satisfied the constitutional requirement of
"due process" under one procedural umbrella that applied to a broad
range of administrative hearings.23 The state APAs generally provide
for a judicial-type adversarial proceeding.24 Without these uniform
procedures, each administrative hearing could potentially be challenged
as constitutionally infirm, reversed and remanded.
It was precisely the analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge that led to an
ad hoc test to determine the application of procedural due process.
The test balanced several interests:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
The nature of these procedural rights, as well as the issue of
whether they should be accorded at all, and at what stage, seemed to
flow from an individual analysis of the facts and circumstances unique
to the factual issues before the appellate courts. Unmistakably,
however, Justice Powell again reiterated Justice Brennan's Goldberg
rationale, that governmental entitlements are a "property" interest to be
23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A, et seq. Charles E. Daye, North
Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.
L. REV. 833, 869, n. 177 (1975) (discussing generally the scope, purpose, and
background of Chapter 150A).
24. Theodore Lowi postulates that the formality of an adversarial hearing
under the federal APA is the ideal but seldom achieved, "[a]nd each agency,
regulatory or not, disposes of the longest proportion of its cases without any
procedure at all, least of all by formal adversary process." See THEODORE J.
LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1979).
25. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
protected under the Due Process Clauses: "[p]rocedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment."26
Mathews followed Goldberg to affirm that the subject matter of an
administrative hearing was "property" subject to due process
protections.
Later, the Supreme Court brought further clarification to the
identification of a protected property interest that the guarantee of
due process arose out of a predicate. Such a predicate may originate,
for example, in a right contained in a state statute, such as a
professional license, public employment, or even a prison regulation.
Other predicates flowed from public institutions such as a student's
right to an uninterrupted public education.27
However, unlike the ad hoc procedures above, the administrative
law judges who routinely try administrative cases are governed by
established procedures describing when, what, and how much
process is due.28  Fortunately, administrative law judges are not
required to analyze and determine the scope of the property interest
or the amount of process due in routine administrative hearings;
rather, they simply refer to their state's legislatively enacted APAs.
Some have observed that the uniform application of procedures have
worked well for substantial property interests but were overly
protective for an insubstantial property interest. Nevertheless, one
APA size (usually) fits all.
In these U.S. Supreme Court decisions (mostly in the 1970s), much
scrutiny was focused on the issue of when temporally the
administrative due process protections must occur i.e., prior to the
"taking," subsequent to the "taking," or at both times. Pre-termination
procedural rights actually became the law of the land under the
rationale of Goldberg.29 In that case, the Supreme Court overtumed a
summary suspension of a welfare recipient's right to continue receiving
a benefit, although the recipient would later be granted a more complete
administrative procedure to offer proof of why the denial was
26. Id. at 332 (emphasis in original text).
27. See Goss supra note 21.
28. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1 etseq.
29. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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unjustified.30  The court focused on the imperatives of the pre-
termination due process rights.31 The post-termination due process
rights were assumed to be similar to judicial court due process rights.
Much of the subsequent development of procedural due process lost
sight of the distinction between pre and post due process.32 Remnants
of pre-termination procedures are found in APA authorized temporary
restraining orders, stays, preliminary injunctions and other emergency
remedies to provide a means to terminate a governmentally conferred
right prior to a post-termination hearing. In state administrative law,
these situations commonly arise in professional licensing, particularly
relating to the prehearing taking of a professional license to protect the
public, for example, from a known and dangerous medical practitioner.
The discussion thus far has centered on the issue of the existence
and definition of a property interest. Judicial opinions, both federal
and state, continue today to address the existence of a property
interest and the due process procedures that are required. Arising
from the Federal Circuits, the United States Supreme Court has
extended the property analysis to liberty interests in an administrative
law context that are subject to the procedural due process rights. The
United States Supreme Court addressed these rights in Hewitt v.
Helms,33 Sandin v. Conner,34 and Wilkinson v. Austin.35
In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth
Circuit, decided that Sandin had not articulated a liberty interest to be
free of segregated confinement, because his loss of liberty did not
substantially differ from his status as any other inmate in a
correctional institution. Therefore, the Court did not reach the
question of whether a substantive predicate existed for Conner, who
based his assertion upon a due process right allegedly found in a
prison regulation.36  However, the Wilkinson Court found that
segregated confinement in an Ohio "Supermax" security prison,
30. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
31. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Supreme Court, however,
followed the Goldberg rationale in deciding the prejudgment replevin procedures
for household goods in Florida and Pennsylvania as unconstitutional.
33. 459 U.S. 460 (1982).
34. 515 U.S 472 (1995).
35. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
36. Id. at 489.
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under extreme conditions, did involve a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but that Ohio had issued regulations that
satisfied the three-pronged Mathews test for procedural due
process. 37 Similar issues pertaining to due process rights have been
raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims when plaintiffs allege
deprivations of constitutional rights under the due process clause in
employment discharge cases. 38
As stated previously,39 due process and its application have been
historically restricted to what occurs in the judicial courts, but now,
clearly, the Supreme Court applied similar due process rights to
executive branch proceedings. However, when the bundle of judicial
due process rights is transferred into the quasi-judicial executive
branch proceedings, they do not always neatly fit.4 ° The complete
panoply of judicial due process rights has never been fully transferred
into the administrative hearings process, but the judicial due process
procedures are so closely akin to the administrative due process
procedures that the two systems have become almost
indistinguishable. Administrative litigants, confronting agency
action, receive most, if not all, trial-type due process rights, i.e., the
right to an informative notice of allegations, the right to a neutral and
detached judge, the right to counsel, the right to call witnesses,4 1 the
right to cross examine adverse witnesses, the right to a transcript, and
the right to judicial review. Although not completely in step with full
judicial due process rights,42 the inescapable conclusion is that
administrative hearings require a trial very similar in process to that
found in judicial courts.43 The executive branch trial involves the
37. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
38. See, e.g., Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d. 1251 (4th Cir. 1994); Dionne v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 40 F.3d. 677 (4th Cir. 1994).
39. See supra text p. 4.
40. Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 739 (1976).
41. Confrontation of adverse witnesses seems to be a hallmark of due process.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). ("In the present context, these
principles require.. .an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse
witness.")
42. For example, one such variation from due process is the noticeable absence
of a right to a jury trial-what the Barons demanded before being disseized.
43. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.1
(1985); see also Frederick Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-
Spring 2008 Due Process; A Detached Judge
10 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
deprivation of a defined property or liberty interest as much as these
deprivations would occur in a judicial branch court and with the same
constitutional consequences as it would in a judicial court.
Military litigation by enemy combatants involves the assertion of
a clear deprivation of a liberty interest, but not the residual liberty
interest addressed in both Sandin44 and Wilkinson45 by incarcerated
inmates challenging compliance with prison regulations establishing
their due process rights prior to their more restricted incarceration in
segregated confinement. This residual liberty interest was based on a
prison regulatory predicate which assertedly required an
administrative hearing under the protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as distinguished from a more direct liberty
interest challenging the continued detainment of alleged enemy
combatants under the protections of the same due process clauses or
under a habeas corpus writ. Such a jurisprudential leap of this
magnitude in administrative law was unprecedented. The question
for enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who have
never had a prior judicial trial and whose confinement rests upon a
legal interest so remarkably different from a citizen's challenge to the
deprivation of a property interest entitlement or a liberty interest
based upon an inmate's challenge to segregated confinement, is
whether denial of such a substantial liberty interest by a military
tribunal comports with the minimum administrative law due process
test under Mathews for hearings ordered by the executive who
defines, with Congressional sanction, these administrative
procedures. The analysis of this question will address recent federal
statutory enactments, recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
and cases now pending before the Supreme Court.46
The constitutionally significant Supreme Court decision in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld " in 2004 turned surprisingly upon the application and
construction of the due process clauses as applied in the Mathews v.
Eldridge administrative law test.48  The plurality followed
Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389
(1977).
44. 515 U.S 472 (1995).
45. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
46. See infra text pp. 10-22.
47. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
48. See supra text p. 6.
administrative law precedents to define the degree of procedural due
process to be accorded a U.S. citizen who challenged his status as an
enemy combatant by way of a petition for habeas corpus.4 9 The
plurality's resolution of the issue was not decided upon resort to
judicial remedies or even habeas corpus remedies. The executive had
contended that constitutional executive power trumped formal due
process procedures and permitted an unlimited deprivation of a
citizen's liberty interests with no trial-type hearing or recourse to the
courts.50  The indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen was justified
solely by the government's affidavit. Justice O'Connor, however,
writing for the plurality, found the deprivation of this liberty interest
sufficient to require the application of due process protections, not in
Article III Constitutional Courts to resolve the habeas corpus petition,
but under administrative law principles in a military-type quasi-
judicial hearing.5 1 The facts in Hamdi called for the application of
the administrative law Mathew's calculus. The plurality emphasized
this application as Justice Scalia termed it in his dissent, joined by
Justice Stevens, to be based upon "a case involving... the withdrawal
of disability benefits" spurning the more traditional judicial remedies
of habeas corpus and criminal treason.52  For the court, Justice
O'Connor stated the Supreme Court's holding as follows: "[w]e
therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the
49. "A petition for a writ of habeas corpus provides the procedure by which an
individual in custody may seek judicial review of the lawfulness of that custody."
Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ, 37 RUTGERs L.J. 68 (2005-06).
50. Id. at 527.
51. Id. at 533. "Hamdi's 'private interest.. .affected by the official action,'
ibid., is the most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in being free from
physical detention by one's government." Id. at 529 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); U.S. v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)).
52. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575 (emphasis in original text). In Justice Scalia's
dissent he rejected the Mathews analysis for a due process liberty interest and,
instead, insisted that habeas corpus was Hamdi's constitutional remedy unless
Congress invoked the "Suspension Clause." Justice Souter's concurring opinion:
"[w]e are heirs to a tradition given voice 800 years ago by the Magna Carta, which
on the barons' insistence confined executive power by "the law of the land."
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government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker."53
Besides Mathews, Justice O'Connor cited Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill,54 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,5 5 Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal.,56 Fuentes v. Shevin,57 and
Armstrong v. Manzo.58  From Concrete Pipe, Justice O'Connor
quoted the following: "[d]ue Process requires a neutral and detached
judge in the first instance., 59 From Armstrong, she recites: "[a]
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. It is an opportunity that must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."60 The case was ultimately remanded to
the district court for the implementation and compliance with the
Mathews test. Contrary to the holding, had the executive in Hamdi
been allowed to unilaterally dictate the due process procedures
without judicial oversight, Hamdi would likely remain incarcerated
today in Charleston, South Carolina, instead of being freed by a
negotiated plea.61 However, once Hamdi's due process rights were
secured, the executive decided not to determine the merits of his
status before a military tribunal, yet to be created. The existence of
the proposed detached and neutral tribunal might have tipped the
scales in favor of a negotiated plea.
In response to Hamdi and followed the same day by Rasul v.
Bush,62 which applied the habeas writ to aliens, the Department of
Defense (DOD) on July 7, 2004, via a Pentagon memorandum,
53. Id. (emphasis added). The plurality court seemed to not only focus on the
due process right to a fair adjudication, but the requirement of notice (citing
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall 223,
233 (1864) "For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process
has been clear: parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.")
54. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
55. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56. 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
57. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
58. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. However, Hamdi forfeited his rights as a U.S. citizen and was expelled.
62. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
established procedures for Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs).63 This Department of Defense memorandum, a four page
document, entitled "Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal," outlined the administrative procedures and defined
"Enemy Combatant., 64 The provision for notice required that the
detainee be notified that he was to be designated as an enemy
combatant.65 It also provided each detainee with an assignment of a
military officer; an opportunity to review reasonable available
information in the possession of the Department of Defense.66 In
summary, the significant procedures provided that "[t]he Tribunal,
through its Recorder, shall have access to and consider any
reasonable information generated in connection with the initial
determination to hold the detainee as an enemy combatant and in any
subsequent review of that determination, as well as any reasonably
available record, determinations, or reports generated in connection
therewith[;], 67 a tribunal composed of three neutral commissioned
officers of the U.S. Armed Forces; 68 the Convening Authority was to
be the Secretary of the Navy who would make the appointments.
69
The procedures included notice of the unclassified factual basis for
the detainees designation; a recorder whose job was to summarize the
63. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of
the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004),
available
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20040707review.pdf.
Note: the due process procedures were specified in an order, not a federal
regulation, statute or other more recognizable form of law.
64. Enemy Combatant is defined as:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. Each
detainee subject to this Order has been determined to be an
enemy combatant through multiple levels of review by officers of




67. Id. atp. 2.
68. Id. atp. 1.
69. Id. at p. 2.
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testimony of the witnesses and report the Tribunal's decision;
allowing the detainee to attend all the proceedings along with a
personal representative; the provision of an interpreter; advising the
detainee of the nature of the proceedings; access to the available
information generated in connection with the review determinations;
the right to call reasonably available witnesses; there were no formal
rules of evidence but permitting consideration of any information
deemed relevant and helpful to the resolution of the issue including
hearsay; the right of the detainee to testify; the right not to be
compelled to testify against himself; and the right to review the
testimony and documents after the hearing.70 The Tribunal was to
determine detainee status by majority vote based on the
preponderance of the evidence.71 The Staff Judge Advocate for the
Convening Authority was to review the record for legal sufficiency
and make a recommendation to the Convening Authority; the
Convening Authority who thereafter reviewed and could approve the
Tribunal's decision or return the record to the Tribunal for further
proceedings. 72  If the decision was in favor of the detainee, a
provision for the release of the non-enemy combatant to his country
of citizenship and a declaration that the order does not create any
rights or benefits and does not otherwise limit the authority of the
President of the United States. 73 These are the procedures that were
to govern the trials of all the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
The procedures were later supplemented by an implementing
directive from the DOD dated July 14, 2006. After Hamdi and Rasul
and clearly in response thereto, not unlike what the states did in
enacting APAs after Goldberg and Matthews, Congress passed the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).74 The Act later required the
70. Id. at pp. 2-3.
71. Id. at p. 3. See also text infra p. 17. The last two provisions triggered the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to order the government to release at least to the
court all reasonable information not included in CSRT's record in order for the
court to determine on appeal whether the preponderance of the evidence
established the fact which supported the conclusions.
72. See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary
of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal at p. 3 (July 7,
2004), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d2004707review.pdf.
73. Id. at p. 4.
74. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 [hereinafter DTA].
Defense Department to submit to the Congressional Armed Services
and Judiciary Committees the procedural rules for determining
detainee status. The Act did not otherwise specify procedures but
required: "the procedures of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
and the Administrative Review Boards established by direction of the
Secretary of Defense that are in operation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
for determining the status of the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay
or to provide an annual review to determine the need to continue to
detain an alien who is a detainee[.]" 75  This Act did statutorily
supplement the DOD procedures as contained in the previously
referenced DOD orders to require the designation of a civilian
official as the final review authority within the Department of
Defense instead of the convening authority appointed by the
Secretary of the Navy. This official was defined as one to which
appointments are required by law to be made by the president, by and
with the advice and consent of the senate. 76 The DTA also provided
for the limitation on statutory habeas corpus in the following way:
"no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay[.] ' 77 It further outlines that judicial review of the decisions of
Combatant Status Review Tribunals placing this review in the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction for the District of Columbia Circuit in
order to: "[d]etermine the validity of any final decision of a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal and that an alien is properly
detained as an Enemy Combatant., 78 The jurisdiction of this court
was to be limited to claims as to persons actually detained by the
Department of Defense and for whom a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal has been conducted pursuant to applicable procedures as
specified by the Secretary of Defense. And, further, whether the
status determination was made "consistent with the standards and
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant
Status Review Tribunals" and that such determination "be supported
75. DTA § 1005(a)(1)(A).
76. The failure of Congress to statutorily enact the procedures could be
interpreted as an attempt to deprive the detainees of a statutory predicate to due
process of law.
77. DTA § 1005(e)(1)(e).
78. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A).
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by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the government's evidence. 79  With the
procedures thus established, these tribunals, began on a course of
quasi administrative adjudication over a course of many months. A
complete record of the evidence was not made at the hearings so
unless an appeal was taken to the D.C. Circuit, little was known
about the evidence. The DOD was required by the DTA to maintain
the evidentiary record, such as it was.
According to a document prepared by Seaton Hall Law entitled
"No-Hearing Hearings CSRT: The Modern Habeas Corpus?," 80 the
authors, reviewed the transcripts and records of the CSRT process,
the following is quoted from page six of the report:
In sum, while the promise procedures stated that the
detainees were allowed to present evidence (witnesses
and documents), the only evidence that the detainees
were permitted to offer in the vast majority of the cases
was their own testimony. As a result, the only option
available to the detainee was to make a statement
attempting to rebut what he could glean from the
summary of classified evidence that he could not see.
In 81% of the cases reviewed, the Tribunals made their
decisions the same day as the hearing. Among the 102
records reviewed for this report, the ultimate decision
was always unanimous, and all detainees reviewed were
ultimately found to be enemy combatants. It is true that
Government statements indicate that 38 of 558
detainees were ultimately found not/no longer to be
enemy combatants, but no such determinations are
found in the full CSRT records reviewed.
79. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i). Both the DOD procedures and the DTA rejected
a model based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice with a history dating back
to George Washington and a reputation for adjudicatory independence as Judges
who preside over military court marshals, as recently noted by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in their October 3, 2007 Reconsideration Order in Bismullah v.
Gates, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23609 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2007).
80. Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearings Hearings CRST.
The Modern Habeas Corpus?, available at
http://law.shu.edu/news/final-no hearing-hearings-report.pdf.
While all detainees reviewed were ultimately found to
be enemy combatants, not all tribunals found the
detainee to be an enemy combatant. On a few
occasions, a tribunal initially found that the detainee
was not/no longer an enemy combatant. In such cases,
the detainee was never told of this decision. Instead, the
Tribunal's decision was reviewed at multiple levels in
the Defense Department chain of command and
eventually a new Tribunal was convened. However,
some detainees were still found not/no longer to be
enemy combatants. At least one detainee's record
indicates that after a second Tribunal found him no
longer an enemy combatant, the process was repealed
and sent back for a third Tribunal which found him to
be an enemy combatant.
In Boumediene v. Bush,8' the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to challenge his
determination as an enemy combatant. A majority of the circuit
judges found that Congress had successfully cut off this Petitioner's
right to habeas corpus jurisdiction in that circuit court. The United
States Supreme Court initially denied Petitioner's request for
review, 82 with three justices dissenting to the denial. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Kennedy, issued a statement explaining their view
that "[d]espite the obvious importance of the issues raised[,]" 83 "the
petitioner should first exhaust remedies available under the DTA
unless the petitioners can show that the government is causing delay
or some other ongoing injury that would make these remedies
inadequate." 84 In the event of such injury, Justice Stevens wrote that
81. 375 U.S. App. D.C. 48,476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
82. 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
83. Id.
84. Jennifer K. Elsea & Kenneth R. Thomas, CRS Report for Congress:
Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court (July
5, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf. Note: The
exhaustion requirement in administrative law requires the completion of the
administrative hearing before there can be pendent or ancillary trials of other
judicial causes of action. The administrative remedy, distinct from the protections
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"an alternative exist [for the Court] to consider [its] jurisdiction over
the allegations ..."85 In June, 2007 the Court reversed its earlier
denial and granted certiorari to hear the consolidated petitions,8 6
although most of the issues in both Boumediene87 and Al Odah88
pertained to the issue of habeas corpus. However, both the
Petitioners and Respondents argue the issue in their Al Odah briefs as
to whether the DTA is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus. 89
These arguments could require the Court to examine and discuss
whether the procedures of the Department of Defense referenced in
the Detainee Treatment Act meet the administrative law analysis
prescribed in Hamdi under the Mathews Test. The issues facing the
Supreme Court, however, look chiefly to the applicability of habeas
corpus to detainees as the exclusive constitutional, statutory and
common law remedy, all relegated to judicial courts and whether the
habeas jurisdiction has been stripped or otherwise suspended by
Congress under the DTA or MCA because the DTA procedures
provided an adequate substitute.90
granted in a judicial court is, therefore, all the constitutional due process that one
receives, subject to a record appeal under a differential standard of review in a
judicial court. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 13.21-13.25 (1997).
85. Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S., slip op. at 2 (citing the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651, and the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241). See Reply Br. 41-
43.
86. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (granting petitions for
rehearing and certiorari); Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007)
(granting petitions for rehearing and certiorari).
87. 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
88. Al Odah v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 524 (2003).
89. Brief for the Petitioner, Al Odah v. United States, 124. S. Ct. 524 (No. 06-
1196).
90. In a reply brief in opposition to Petitioner's request of rehearing for
reconsideration for granting certiorari in Al Odah v. United States on Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the United Court of Appeals from the District of Columbia Circuit,
Reply in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, No. 06-1196, on p. 4, paragraph 4, the
following is quoted:
Finally, it is now clear that, not only is the remedy provided by the
DTA inadequate, but also the underlying CSRT process was an
irremediable sham. A courageous Military Officer, Lt. Colonel
Stephen Abraham, United States Arm Reserve, has come forward
with a declaration responding to assertions about the adequacy of
the CSRT process made on behalf of the government by Rear
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Admiral (retired) James M. McGarrah in the Bismullah case. Based
on his personal experience, first as a factual investigator and then as
a member of a CSRT Tribunal, Lt. Colonel Abraham avers that, in
every phase, the CSRT process was infected with command
influence and an illusion. See annexed Declaration of Stephen
Abraham. I, Stephen Abraham, hereby declare as follows:
1. I am a Lt. Colonel in the United States Army Reserve, having
been commissioned in 1981 as an officer in Intelligence Corps. I
have served as an Intelligence Officer from 1982 to the present
during periods of both reserve and active duty, including
mobilization in 1990 ("Operation Desert Storm") and twice again
following 9-11. In my civilian occupation I am an attorney with the
law firm Fink & Abraham LLP in Newport Beach, California.
7. The Recorders exercised little control over the process of
accumulating information to be presented to the CSRT Board
Members. Rather, the information was typically aggregated by
individuals identified as case writers who, in most instances, had the
same limited degree of knowledge and experience relating to the
Intelligence Community and Intelligence Products. The case
writers, and not the recorders, were primarily responsible for
accumulating documents, including assembling documents to be
used in the drafting of an unclassified summary of the factual basis
for the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant.
9. Beyond "generic" information, the case writer would
frequently rely upon information contained within the Joint
Detainee Information Management System ("JDIMS"). The sub-
sect of that system available to the case writers was limited in terms
of the scope of information, typically excluding information that
was characterized as highly sensitive law enforcement information,
highly classified information, or information not voluntarily
released by the originating agency. In that regard, JDIMS did not
constitute a complete repository, although this limitation was
frequently not understood by individuals with access to or who
relied upon the system as a source of information. Other data bases
available to the case writer were similarly deficient. The case
writers and Recorders did not have access to numerous information
sources generally available within the intelligence community.
11. During my trips to the participating organizations I was
allowed only limited access to information, typically pre-screened
and filtered. I was not permitted to see any information other than
that specifically prepared in advance of my visit. I was not
permitted to request that further searches be performed. I was given
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no assurance that the information provided for my examination
represented a complete compilation of information or that any
summary of information constituted an accurate distillation of the
body of available information relating to the subject.
12. I was specifically told on a number of occasions that the
information provided to me was all that I would be shown, but I
was never told that the information that was provided constituted all
available information. On those occasions when I asked that a
representative of the organization provide a written statement that
there was no exculpatory evidence, the requests were summarily
denied.
13. At one point, following a review of information, I asked
the Office of General of the Intelligence Organization that I was
visiting for a statement that no exculpatory information had been
withheld. I explained that I was tasked to review all available
materials and to reach conclusion regarding the non-existence of
exculpatory information, and that I could not do so without
knowing that I had seen all the information.
14. The request was denied, coupled with a refusal even to
acknowledge whether there existed additional information that I
was not permitted review. In short, based upon the selected review
that I was permitted, I was left to "infer" from the absence of
exculpatory information in the materials. I was allowed to review
that no such information existed in materials I was not allowed to
review.
15. Following that exchange, I communicated to Rear
Admiral McGarrah and then the OARDEC Deputy Director. The
fundamental limitations imposed upon my review of the
organization's files and inability to state conclusively that no
exculpatory information existed relating to the CSRT subject. It
was not possible for me to certify or validate the non-existence of
exculpatory evidence as related to any individual undergoing the
CSRT process.
16. The content of intelligence products, including data-bases,
made available to case writers, Recorders, or liaisons officers, was
often left entirely to the discretion of the organizations providing
the information. What information was not included in the bodies
of intelligence products was typically unknown to the case writers
and Reporters, as was the bases for limiting the information. In
other words, the person preparing materials for use by the CSRT
Board Members did not know whether they had examined all
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available information or even why they possessed some pieces of
information but not others.
19. Following the quality assurance process, the unclassified
summary and the information assembled by the case writer in
support of the summary would then be forwarded to the Recorder.
It was very rare that a Recorder or a personal representative would
seek additional information beyond that information provided by
the case writer.
20. It was not apparent to me how assignments to CSRT
panels were made, nor was I personally involved in that process.
Nevertheless, I discerned the determinations of who would be
assigned to any particular position, whether as a member of a CSRT
or to some other position, to be largely the product of an ad hoc
decisions by a relatively small group of individuals. All CSRT
panel members were assigned to OARDEC and reported ultimately
to Rear Admiral McGarrah. It was well known by the officers in
OARDEC that any time a CSRT panel determined that a detainee
was not properly classified as an enemy combatant, the panel
members would have to explain their findings to OARDEC Deputy
Director. There would be intensive scrutiny of the findings by
Rear Admiral McGarrah who would, in turn have to explain the
findings to his superiors, including the Under Secretary of the Navy.
21. On one occasion, I was assigned to a CSRT panel with
two other officers, an Air Force colonel and an Air Force major, the
latter understood by me to be a judge advocate. We reviewed
evidence presented to us regarding the recommended status of a
detainee. All of us found the information presented to lack
substance.
23. On the basis of the paucity and weakness of the information
provided both during and after the CSRT hearing, we determined
that there was no factual basis for concluding that the individual
should be classified as an enemy combatant. Rear Admiral
McGarrah and the Deputy Director immediately questioned the
validity of our findings. They directed us to write out the specific
questions that we had raised concerning the evidence to allow the
Recorder an opportunity to provide further responses. We were
then ordered to reopen the hearing to allow the Recorder to present
further argument as to why the detainee should be classified as an
enemy combatant. Ultimately, in the absence of any substantive
response to the questions and no basis for concluding the additional
information would be forthcoming, we did not change our
determination that the detainee was not properly classified as an
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Bismullah v. Gates/Parhat v. Gates,91 is another detainee case
presently pending in the D.C. Circuit where certain discovery orders
have been issued.92  The Petitioners challenged the government's
finding of enemy combatant status under the DTA under the CSRT
procedures. In order for the court to conduct judicial review, it first
must determine the method and standard for judicial review of the
CSRT record. Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit must examine the evidence
available under the DTA in order to determine whether a
preponderance of the evidence supports the CSRT determination. In
order to make that determination, a complete record was required by
the court which exceeded what Petitioners were permitted to access at
hearing in contrast to the information reasonably available to the
government at the CSRT hearing. At issue is the requirement to
disclose to the court, in camera or ex parte, allegedly sensitive or
classified information in the government's possession that was
unavailable to the Petitioner at the hearing. Both Petitioners' and
Respondents' briefs in Bismullah address the Supreme Court's
consideration of Boumediene and Al Odah with respect to the issues
pending in Bismullah which was decided by the Washington, D.C.
Court July 20, 2007, order for rehearing denied, October 3, 2007.93
If the United States Supreme Court in Boumediene rules outside of
the context of the federal question of whether Congress statutorily
suspended or stripped the federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction
for Guantanamo detainees as addressed in the Constitution and at
common law, then the Supreme Court may look to whether the DTA
and CRST procedures meet the Hamdi test, constructed under
Mathews. More likely, the Court will instead determine whether the
enemy combatant. OARDEC's response to the outcome was
consistent with the view other instances of which a fmding of "Not
an Enemy Combatant" (NEC) had been reached by the CSRT
boards. In each of the meetings that I attended the OARDEC
leadership finding of NEC, the focus of inquiry on the part of the
leadership was "what went wrong."
24. I was not assigned to another CSRT Panel.
91. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17544 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2007) (order on
procedural motions No. 06-1197).
92. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18265 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2007).
93. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23609 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2007).
El-Banna Br. 32 n. 30, Al Odah Br. § 32, R Br. 41 N. 16.
CRST procedures are an adequate substitute for habeas, and not
whether the CRST procedures meet the Mathews' test. The suspension
standard for habeas is a greater standard than the administrative law test
of Mathews.
There can be no greater interest than a liberty interest (versus the
property interest) that is subject to scrutiny for protection under the Due
Process Clause. But, even under the Mathews test, the procedures that
define and determine a detainee's liberty interest must be carefully
balanced against the government's interest to detain suspected enemy
combatants. The liberty interest protects one's freedom from false
incarceration, and as a consequence, a heightened protective
administrative procedure must be in place to prevent an erroneous
deprivation. There are a number of infirmities which govern these
procedures identified in the CSRT as permitted in the DTA. Unlike
most state APAs, the CSRT procedures are not statutorily defined but
are stated in policies promulgated by the Department of Defense,
recognized by and subject to certain modifications that are contained in
the DTA. The Supreme Court may also be tempted to peak at the
totality of results found from the records of the cases in Guantanamo
and the dispositions of those cases to determine the overall validity of
these procedures to protect a liberty interest under either the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Suspension Clause.9 4
The Supreme Court does not have before it presently an evidentiary
record to review but must decide the question based upon a facial
challenge to the procedures, prior to a requirement for exhaustion. At
the time of Hamdi in 2004, the Supreme Court had no DOD
administrative procedures before it to analyze (because there were none
in existence), prior to the issuance of the CSRT procedures or the
enactment of the DTA. However, the Supreme Court does now have
both CSRT procedures and the DTA before the Court, in addition to the
Military Commission's Act of 2006 (MCA). Aside from further
addressing the habeas stripping provisions enacted in the MCA after
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,95 these provisions are not subject to the balancing
test articulated in Hamdi because the MCA involves a trial of enemy
combatant for violation of the Articles of War, not a determination of
94. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Write of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.").
95. 126 U.S. 2749 (2006).
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the correctness of a detainee's status. The court may well determine
that the interest of the government in determining enemy combatant
status as balanced against a detainee's liberty interest is sufficient under
the CSRT procedures employed and authorized by the DTA, both
under the Mathews test and the habeas Suspension test.
The defect may not lie with the DTA or the CRST procedures.
96
The Supreme Court may very well determine that the administrative
procedures authorized in the DTA meet the minimum constitutional test
for an administrative adjudication under the Mathews test.
Notwithstanding, under either test, a problem persists. The problem is,
not solely the lack of minimum due process administrative procedures,
but the apparent lack of a meaningful hearing, presided over by a
neutral decision maker.
Detachment connotes a physical disconnect from the agency. It
also connotes an emotional detachment from the case to reach the truth
under law. Prior to Goldberg,97 the agency hearing officer may have
merely been an administrative functionary whose job it was to fulfill
agency expectations. After Goldberg, the hearing officials,
administrative law judges and military tribunals officers became the
guardian of an individual's constitutional right to due process of law.
These administrative adjudicators must remain free, detached and
unfettered to decide the case solely under the facts as found in the
record and then by application of the rule of law.
What the Supreme Court decides in Boumediene likely will not
address the Mathews test and quasi-judicial administrative law issues,
but likely will be decided under an analysis of the Great Writ.98 The
historical liberty interest protected by the Great Writ may be too
significant of an interest to be left to executive branch administrative
law procedures. Justice O'Conner, for the plurality in Hamdi,
fashioned a model to follow. Joining in this plurality was one of the
96. Even given the infirmities and questionable use of information secured by
torture which is not automatically excluded, the exclusion of legal counsel from
the hearing, the use of a disinterested personal representative, the shifting
burden, and the differential standard of review given to the government without
the development of an adequate record.
97. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
98. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A
Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769 (1979) (describing the application of
the Great Writ).
most skeptical of the Mathews detractors, then Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who joined the middle ground between the unrestricted application of
habeas relief in judicial courts for enemy combatants and the unfettered
exercise of executive war powers by the Commander-in-Chief by
adopting a position that resorted to administrative law precedents,
ironically based upon Mathews. But it may now be too late to ever
return to an administrative law analysis in Boumediene. Why?
Administrative adjudication under DTA and DOD procedures may
have failed to provide an unbiased decision-maker.99
99. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the
Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L.
REv. 112 (2005), stating that:
Due process also incorporates a specific mechanism to ensure
that the government acts in accordance with law - fair
procedures. The requirements of notice and an opportunity to be
heard by an unbiased decision-maker provide an effective means
of constraining factual determinations and the application of the
law to those facts.
See also Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo
Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense
Data. In their profile of 517 detainees, Mark and Joshua Denbeaux found:
1. Fifty-five percent (55%) of the detainees are not
determined to have committed any hostile acts against the United
States or its coalition allies.
2. Only 8% of the detainees were characterized as
al Qaeda fighters. Of the remaining detainees, 40% have no
definitive connection with al Qaeda at all and 18% are have no
definitive affiliation with either al Qaeda or the Taliban.
3. The Government has detained numerous persons
based on mere affiliations with a large number of groups that in
fact, are not on the Department of Homeland Security terrorist
watchlist. Moreover, the nexus between such a detainee and such
organizations varies considerably. Eight percent are detained
because they are deemed "fighter for," 30% considered "members
of;" a large majority - 60% - are detained merely because they are
"associated with" a group or groups the Government asserts are
terrorist organizations. For 2% of the prisoners their nexus to any
terrorist group is unidentified.
4. Only 5% of the detainees were captured by
United States forces. 86% of the detainees were arrested by either
Pakistan or the Northern Alliance and turned over to United States
custody.
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The assurance of an impartial decision maker is a fundamental
guarantee of procedural due process in all forums.' 00 If administrative
adjudications fail to afford litigants this fundamental guarantee, then
quasi-judicial tribunals may not provide the required due process
protections. Command influence over the decision makers, particularly
as articulated by Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham in his affidavit, questions
neutrality at its most fundamental level.
Administrative hearings are quasi-judicial, Courts are fully judicial.
The decision to create a federal APA in the 1940s spumed the judicial
model in deference to the quasi-judicial administrative hearings. Some
commentators sided with President Roosevelt's preference for an APA
as a measure to protect the President's implementation of his
administration's New Deal policies, without unnecessary interference
from the judiciary. 0 1 If this is a correct assumption, then the very birth
of the federal APA permitted deference to agency adjudication, a
deference that arguably still historically exists.102 It was not until
Goldberg that a constitutional connection was made to tie the subject
matter of the quasi-judicial hearing to a skeptically defined property
interest, but a property interest nevertheless, one specifically protected
by the constitution.' 03 However, this constitutional remedy remained in
the executive branch's administrative hearing, not in a judicial branch
court. After Goldberg, a historical line was drawn from the executive's
administrative hearing along a parallel course of the judicial branch
court back to the Law of the Land provision in the Magna Carta and the
indispensable requirement of due process that was confined by the Rule
This 86% of the detainees captured by Pakistan or the Northern
Alliance were handed over to the United States at a time in which
the United States offered large bounties for capture of suspected
enemies.
5. Finally, the population of persons deemed not to
be enemy combatants - mostly Uighers - are in fact accused of
more serious allegations than a great many persons still deemed to
be enemy combatants.
100. An impartial decision maker prevents the government from providing a
process that has predetermined outcomes.
101. KENNETH GULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.04 (2D ED. 1972).
102. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
103. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1268 (1975).
of Law. With Goldberg came a perceptible shift away from deference
to neutrality. The Barons, knowing the sovereign's power to control or
even dictate judicial outcomes, insisted that the King grant an assurance
of neutrality that did not rest upon appointed judges but by the
judgment of their peers.
The hallmark of judicial due process is the right to trial by jury. 104
The list of similarities between the due process rights of litigants in
administrative hearings and judicial hearings does not include the right
to trial by jury. Due to this absence, the burden placed on the
administrative hearing official, who determines both the facts and the
application of law to those facts, united in one official, increases the
demand for neutrality. The interest adjudicated in Mathews was a
newly articulated property interest, the deprivation of which often
related only to a financial loss. The shift of the due process interest
from property to liberty, further increased the pressure to require a
neutral decision-maker because the risk of an erroneous deprivation
was not just financial, but the more substantive liberty interest.
Heretofore, the liberty interest cases involved administrative remedies
for incarceration of inmates in segregated confinement. Full judicial
protections under the Due Process Clause, including a right to trial by
jury, had been available to these administrative litigants prior to
incarceration. The Guantanamo detainees, prior to Hamdi, had been
incarcerated and held solely upon the assertion of the executive that the
detainee was an enemy combatant. This detainment could legally be
maintained until the cessation of the war on terror.
The Magna Carta was referenced in Petitioners' Brief in Al Odah
Et. Al. (Al Odah Br. 21) ("No freeman shall be taken, nor imprisoned,
nor disseised, nor outlawed, nor banished..."). The Magna Carta,
arguably the greatest writing in all jurisprudence, contemplates the loss
of such a liberty interest only upon the adherence to the Law of the
Land. At no juncture have the alleged detainees at Guantanamo been
granted the highest due process protection, a right to a trial by jury, nor
arguably should detainees have such a right. But they are entitled to a
neutral decision-maker as both trier of fact and judge of the law. As a
further protector of this liberty interest, the Great Writ became the
bedrock of English Jurisprudence. The concept was so imbedded in
English jurisprudence that it sailed with the English Colonist to the
104. III William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765).
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New World to be eventually encapsulated in the American
Constitution.
Almost 800 years after Runnymeade, the United States Supreme
Court in Boumediene must square an innocent detainee's right to be
free from a false incarceration against the executive's responsibility to
imprison terrorists for the protection of U.S. citizens. Whether these
protections are presided over by a judge in an administrative forum or
by a judge (and jury) in a judicial branch court, due process demands a
detached and neutral judge. The magnitude of such a liberty interest
must not be left to military procedures found in a four-page
memorandum, even if facially adequate under the litmus test of
Mathews. Assuming the failure of suspension, the Supreme Court must
reject administrative law due process procedures and return to the
bedrock of Anglo-American Jurisprudence - The Great Writ!
